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Public sector occupies a prominent position in the Indian economy. The present 
government policy is to divest its holding in PSUs, without privatizing profit making 
PSUs. It has also decided to provide full autonomy to the board of directors of those 
enterprises. This provides an interesting setting to examine corporate governance issues. 
This paper examines corporate governance issues in the context of present disinvestment 




Public sector occupies a prominent position in the Indian economy. The investment in the 
central public sector undertakings (PSUs) has grown from Rs.29 crores (Rs.290 million) 
as on 1.4.1951 to Rs. 2, 52,554 crores (Rs. 2,525 billion) as on 31.3.2000. PSUs hold a 
major position in terms of market size and assets. In terms of sales among the top 10 
companies (Business World
1, 28
th February 2005), 8 companies are in the public sector, 
and among the top 50 companies 29 companies are in the public sector. In terms of 
assets, among the top 10 companies 9 companies are in the public sector, and among the 
top 50 companies 32 companies are in the public sector.  
 
 Public investment in industry was a part of the planning model adopted by the Indian 
government immediately after independence (1947). The government decided public 
investment in the following three areas: 
a)  Infrastructure; 
b)  Investment directed primarily towards agriculture; and 
c)  Investment directed towards industrial development. 
 
The main objectives for setting up PSUs as stated in the industrial policy resolution of 
1956 were: 
 
a)  To help in rapid economic growth and industrialization of the country and create 
the necessary infrastructure for economic development; 
b)  To earn return on investment and thus generate resources for development; 
c)  To promote redistribution of income and wealth; 
                                                 
1  Business world is a business magazine being published weekly by ABP (P) Limited, Calcutta, India 
  1d)  To create employment opportunities; 
e)  To promote balanced regional development; 
f)  To assist the development of small-scale and ancillary industries; and 
g)  To promote import substitution, save and earn foreign exchange for the economy. 
 
The thrust area in the second five year plan (1956/57-1960/61) was building capacity in 
heavy industry through public investment. It was thought that PSUs would generate 
surplus from their operations, which would support augmentation of the capital stock. 
Although PSUs could generate employment opportunities, it could not generate surplus to 
augment the capital stock. In the words of Sukhamoy Chakravarty (1987, pp 30): 
 
“The situation became worse because the main action correlate, that a rapid build-up of 
publicly owned capital stock going to help channel an increasing proportion of surplus 
flow into public coffers, turned out to be quite an unreliable instrument for this purpose. 
This was partly because of the inefficiency in setting up and running these enterprises, 
and partly because the government did not possess enough clarity of objectives for the 
public sector. In fact, much of the early discussion on public sector pricing policy was 
based on the idea that the public sector ought not to make profits.” 
 
According to Amiya Kumar Bagchi (1998, pp 306) surplus generated by PSUs was larger 
than the amount reported by them. He writes: 
 
“Many economists have pointed to deliberate under pricing of public sector goods and 
services, along with various open and concealed subsidies provided by the public to the 
private sector, in addition to inefficiency and under utilization of capacity in the public 
sector, as reasons for persistent excess of public sector investment over its savings. There 
is little doubt that the true surplus of the public sector would have been consistently 
higher if the implicit and explicit subsidies to the private sector were added to the 
nominal income of the public sector. But even after taking such transfers into account, 
there would probably remain a large and positive gap between the gross domestic capital 
formation of the public sector and its savings.” 
 
Many reasons have been sited in the literature for the poor performance of PSUs. Bagchi 




The experience of other developing countries regarding performance of PSUs is no 
different. Mihir Rakshit (1997, pp 27) observes: 
 
“An important ingredient of the industrialization policy in many developing countries, 
like, India, was large scale public investment in crucial sectors of the economy so as to 
internalize externalities, correct for market distortions and raise the overall savings 
ratio. However, the relatively poor performance of public sector enterprises in terms of 
both factor productivity and the generation of savings created serious obstacles in 
realizing the basic objectives of the heavy industry strategy (Choksi, 1979; Krueger and 
Tuncer, 1982a, 1982b). The problem was compounded by the difficulties on the political 
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involve a reduction or a substantial change in the composition, of the labour force” 
 
The seventh five year plan (1985/86-1989/90) proposed a large-scale stepping up of 
surplus from public enterprises. The government appreciated that though there was great 
potential for generating surplus by PSUs, it would not be achieved with the then 
prevalent style of functioning of those enterprises. The government decided to grant 
functional autonomy to those enterprises. It introduced the concept of Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU). The policy received a boost in the wake of the new industrial 
policy of 1991, as a consequence of economic liberalization. In 1997 government granted 
enhanced autonomy and delegation of powers to PSUs that have the competitive 
advantage to become global giants (known as navaratnas
2) and to other profit making 
PSUs. 
 
As a part of the restructuring of the economy, the government decided to divest its 
holding in PSUs. The disinvestment process which began in 1991-92 with the sale of 
minority stakes in some PSUs, shifted focus to strategic sales during 1999-2000 to 2003-
04. Although there is a consensus about restructuring of PSUs, it is not that every one 
agrees to privatization.  
 
The United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government, the coalition government that came 
to power in 2004, modified the disinvestment policy. The Economic Survey 2004-05 
(2005) presents the current government policy on PSUs. The main features of the present 
policy are as follows: 
 
a)  The government is committed to a strong and effective public sector whose social 
objectives are met by its commercial functioning; 
b)  The government is committed to devolve full managerial and commercial 
autonomy to successful, profit-making companies operating in a competitive 
environment; 
c)  Generally profit-making companies will not be privatized; 
d)  The government will retain the existing ‘navaratna’ companies in the public 
sector, while these companies would be encouraged to raise resources from the 
capital market; 
e)  While every effort will be made to modernize and restructure sick public sector 
companies and revive sick industry, chronically loss-making companies will be 
either sold-off or closed, after all workers get their legitimate dues and 
compensation; and 
f)  The government will take the help of private industry to turn-around companies 
that have potential for revival. 
 
In short, the new policy will result in: 
 
a)  Managerial and commercial autonomy to the management of public sector 
undertakings that are operating in a competitive environment; 
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holding more than 50% but less than 100% voting right; and 
c)  Performance measurement based on commercial parameters. 
 
The current policy provides an interesting setting for the study of corporate governance 
issues in the public sector. This paper explores various issues in the context of the new 
disinvestment policy.  
 
In this paper we assume that the present disinvestment policy will not be reversed and 
PSUs, particularly those in core sectors, will not be privatized. In future government will 
hold majority voting rights in navratna and profit making PSUs. As a result, although 
private ownership might concentrate over time, those enterprises will remain in the public 
sector. With the listing of securities in the stock exchange, PSUs will be subject to the 
SEBI regulations. Those undertakings will have the same governance structure as 
required under clause 49 of the listing agreement
3. They will be managed by professional 
managers without interference by the government in the day to day functioning.  
 
2. Theory of Firm and Corporate Governance 
 
Corporate governance is the response to the agency problems that arise from the 
separation of ownership and control. Agency problems are not unique to publicly traded 
companies. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that agency problem is inherent in any 
type of ‘cooperative activity’, because participants in any cooperative activity have their 
own preferences and bias, and they may not act in the manner expected by other 
participants. Therefore, to examine corporate governance issues only from the 
perspective of agency problem, where manager is the agent and shareholders as a class is 
the principal, is inadequate. It is appropriate to examine corporate governance issues by 
investigating the structure of a firm. There are two main definitions of firm available in 
the literature.  
 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) define a firm as a nexus of contracts. If a firm is a nexus of 
contracts, corporate governance is governance of a network of complex contracts. If we 
agree with Jensen and Meckling (1976) that every stakeholder other than shareholders 
can write a complete contract, in the sense that the contract covers all possible 
contingencies, the firm should be managed by shareholders in their best interest after 
enforcing the rights under contracts between different stakeholders. For example, bond 
holders, creditors, customers, and employees write complete contracts and therefore their 
share in the value (quasi rent) that the firm creates is defined ex-ante. There is no need for 
any ex-post adjustment. They expect enforcement of their rights under contracts. 
Enforcement of their rights depends significantly on the protection available to them 
under the law of the land and the effectiveness in enforcing the law. Not that every one 
agrees that stakeholders other than shareholders can write complete contracts. For 
example, Zingales (2004) believes that for most stakeholders writing a complete contract 
is either impossible or very costly. If we assume that most stakeholders including 
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distribution of value ex-post. In absence of an adequate and effective mechanism, ex-post 
distribution depends on the relative bargaining power of various stakeholders. This 
results in inequitable distribution, which is undesirable.  
 
Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) define the firm as a collection of 
physical assets that are jointly owned. Ownership is important because it confers the right 
to make decisions in all contingencies unspecified by the initial contract. The right of 
shareholders is the residual right. Therefore, shareholders as a group are considered the 
owner of the assets and the law vests on them the right to manage those assets. Corporate 
governance aims to protect interests of non-controlling shareholders and debt holders, 
who do not have control on the operating and financing decisions of the firm. Rights of 
other stakeholders are protected by specific contracts and by the law of the land.   
 
In order to discuss issues concerning corporate governance, a firm may be viewed as a 
collection of physical assets which are financed by shareholders and debt holders, who 
have claims on the value (quasi rent) that is created by the use of those assets. Stake 
holders other than investors can write complete contracts and their interest is protected by 
law. Although return on capital and the return of capital to debt holders are well defined 
ex-ante and fully protected in a situation when the value of the assets of the firm exceeds 
their claim, actual return on and return of capital is contingent on the value of the assets 
of the firm after the initial contract. Value of assets after the initial contract depends on 
the use of assets under various states of nature and contingencies. Therefore, debt holders 
have interest in the operating and financing decisions of the firm. They protect their right 
by an effective monitoring of the use of assets.   
 
The claim of shareholders is residual. Therefore, the right to take operating and financing 
decisions primarily vests with shareholders. However, each shareholder cannot exercise 
the right individually. Therefore they delegate that right to the board of directors. A 
shareholder can exercise her voting right directly by attending general meetings or 
through proxy for electing the board of directors. Usually one share has one vote. 
Therefore, in absence of shareholder activism, the control on the assets of the firm 
usually rests with the group that has control over  the maximum voting rights either 
through ownership or otherwise, for example, by arrangements with other large 
shareholders. The board of directors delegates its power to manage the assets of the firm 
to specialist managers primarily because of the complexity of the business. The primary 
responsibility of the board is to engage and monitor the executive management (the CEO 
and her team), and when necessary to replace it. We may view the board as the apex body 
in the corporate internal control system. 
 
3. Objective Function of a Firm 
 
The first issue in corporate governance is to establish the objective function of the firm.  
At the individual firm level, one should ask the question what the firm is trying to 
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economy-wide or social level we should ask the question how we want to measure the 
performance of firms operating in our economy.  
 
Jensen (2001) argues that the objective function of a firm should be to maximize the 
value of the firm. Value of a firm is the total of the market value of equity and the market 
value of debt.  Jensen and many others argue against the stake holder theory of corporate 
governance, which says that corporate governance should take care of the welfare of all 
stake holders. According to them the stake holder theory leads to multiplicity of objective 
functions that managers of a firm is expected to achieve and thus, reduces their focus on 
the primary objective of the firm and dilutes the accountability of managers. They argue 
that maximization of the firm value achieves the objective of social welfare so long as a 
firm is not creating negative ‘externalities’
4. If a competition law is in place and proper 
institutions (like regulators and consumer courts) exist to protect the interest of 
consumers, ‘maximization of firm value’ is the appropriate objective function of a firm, 
because the product market determines the legitimacy of the existence of the firm. If a 
firm fails in the product market it ceases to exist. The objective function ‘maximization 
of firm value’ leads to social welfare because in the input markets, suppliers of inputs 
voluntarily participate in the market, and they participate so long as they earn a fair return 
on their investment. Even if they earn a ‘rent’ it is a transfer of wealth in the economy 
and not a waste. However, the government should protect the interest of those suppliers 
of inputs who have very weak bargaining power. For example, the government protects 
the interest of workers and suppliers of agricultural produce. If institutions in an economy 
are weak, ‘maximization of firm value, does not lead to the welfare of the society. For 
example if institutions fail to ensure that ‘minimum wages’ are paid to workers, 
maximization of firm value would not lead to social welfare. Similarly, if the government 
cannot effectively implement the environment law, firms would create negative 
externalities, or if regulators are taken over by firms on the strength of their nexus with 
politics, ‘maximization of firm value’ does not lead to social welfare. Although 
institutions in India are quite weak, for the purpose of this paper we assume that 
‘maximization of the firm value’ should be the objective function of a business firm.     
 
3.1. Objective function of PSUs 
 
What should be the objective function of a firm in the public sector? Should it be 
different from firms operating in the private sector? Mihir Rakshit (1997, pp 31-32) 
observes: 
 
“What is no less important, performance of enterprises should be judged on the basis of 
their profitability and they must not be called upon to bear the cost of attaining other 
goals like support to special sectors or groups, however deserving they may be. The cost 
of all such support public sector undertakings are required to provide should be borne by 
the Treasury. This will help greatly in judging the efficiency of enterprises and estimating 
the benefit-cost of various schemes of subsidy and support.” 
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firm value’ cannot be the objective function of all firms operating in the public sector. 
Unlike a firm in the private sector, a public sector firm is not simply a vehicle for creating 
wealth for investors. PSUs, particularly those that are operating in areas of strategic 
importance, are expected to create ‘positive externalities’. For example, ONGC cannot 
decide ‘maximization of firm value’ as its objective function. The government would like 
to use ONGC as a vehicle for implementing its strategy for achieving energy security. 
The conflict between the objective function ‘maximize firm value’ and the broader 
national interest gets reflected in the following paragraph published in the Business world 
(7
th March 2005, pp 28): 
 
“Aiyar
2 apparently believes that oil and gas PSUs are marching to the beat of their own 
drum and aren’t acting in concert. He isn’t very happy about ONGC’s plan to set up 
power projects and special economic zones. He is also cut up about GAIL’s public 
insistence that the proposed national gas grid be set up only by them, to the exclusion of 
other players. There are also strong rivalries that exist today among oil and gas PSUs. 
While that need not necessarily be bad—after all, these companies are supposed to 
maximize shareholder wealth—Aiyar believes that given the larger national interest of 
energy security, they need to rethink their priorities.” 
 
P. Chidambaram in his budget (2005-06) speech
3 says: 
 
“Last year, I had promised that agricultural credit will be increased by 30 per cent, and I 
am happy to inform the House that against the announced target of Rs.105,000 crore, we 
are likely to achieve a disbursement of Rs.108,500 crore. Public sector banks and 
regional rural banks have added so far 58.20 lakhs new farmers to their portfolio of 
borrowers”. 
 
The above statement provides evidence that the government uses PSUs as instruments for 
social welfare and not as a pure commercial venture of the government. 
 
In absence of a well defined government strategy and clear mandate from the 
government, the board of directors of a PSU makes conflicting statements about the 
objective function in various public communications. We may take the example pf Indian 
Oil Corporation Limited (to be referred as Indian Oil), which is a highly respected 
‘navaratna’ PSU. The vision ( Annual report 2003-04, pp A-6) of the company is: 
“To be a major, diversified, transnational, integrated energy company, with national 
leadership and a strong environment conscience, playing a national role in oil security 
and public distribution”. (Emphasis is added by the author.) 
 
The company’s’ philosophy on corporate governance (Annual Report 2003-04, pp A-60) 
is as follows: 
                                                 
2 Aiyar in the paragraph refers to Mani shankar Aiyar,the Petroleum Minister in the UPA government, 
since May 2004. 
3 P. Chidambaram is the Finance Minister in the UPA government since May 2004. The speech refers to his 
speech in the Parliament on February 28,2005 while presenting the budget for the year 2005-06. 
  7 
“Indian Oil consistently endeavors to attend the highest standards of corporate 
governance by ensuring transparency in all operations, disclosures and to maximize 
shareholder’s value. Indian Oil is also committed to its other business constituents like 
customers, employees, suppliers, dealers and the community at large. In order to fulfill 
these objectives , Indian Oil fully complies with the stipulations laid down in the 
guidelines on Corporate Governance as specified in clause 49 of the Listing Agreement  
executed with the Stock Exchanges.” (Emphasis is added by the author.) 
 
The vision is to play ‘a national role in oil security and public distribution’. The corporate 
governance philosophy focuses on ‘maximization of shareholder’s value’. The company 
cannot have two objective functions that are conflicting in nature. The company will have 
to focus on either of the two objectives, because in many situations, the board of directors 
will find it impossible to balance these two objectives. The two public statements quoted 
above are like two guide posts directing towards two different directions. They have the 
potential to confuse the board of directors and stakeholders of the company, and to create 
unwarranted strain on the management. Moreover, multiplicity of objectives dilutes the 
management’s accountability.  
 
It is appropriate that the government should use PSUs as instruments to achieve its social 
objectives, which is often manifested as political objectives. Economists view that PSUs 
are owned by public (tax payers) and managed by bureaucrats (politicians). Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) describe the structure of PSUs as a situation in which bureaucrats retain 
concentrated control rights without cash flow rights. The bureaucrat’s main concern is to 
achieve their political objectives, objectives which do not coincide with the profit 
maximization objectives. Boycko et al. (1996), and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) observe 
that privatization transfers ownership to outside investors, who place greater emphasis on 
profits and efficiency.  
 
We believe that privatization leads to concentration of private ownership and the 
government is deprived of the right to use PSUs as instruments for creating social 
welfare. Therefore, we support the present disinvestment policy of the government. 
Disinvestment should not lead to privatization. 
 
4. Corporate Governance Models 
 
Corporate governance models for business firms discussed in the literature are based on 
the assumption that the objective function of a firm is ‘maximization of firm value’. 
Therefore, corporate governance models endeavor to ensure that managers use resources 
(assets and people) to maximize the value of the firm. In this section we summarize 
corporate governance models available in the literature. 
 
4.1. Provision for incentives 
 
  8Incentive contracts should reward or punish managers based on objective measure of 
performance. The optimal contract should take into account, among other things, the risk 
aversion of the manager and the effect of her decision on the firm. Incentives linked to 
performance may drive managers to manipulate data, for example, managers may resort 
to earnings management. Literature has found a small sensitivity of executive 
compensation to the share price. 
 
4.2. Monitoring and control 
 
Information signals usually come from the capital market. For example, an institutional 
investor or pension fund disinvests (“exits”) if performance of the firm is poor. 
Therefore, transparency in and timeliness of corporate financial reporting enhances 
passive monitoring and control. However, many economists believe that short-termist and 
bias decisions of institutional investors reduce the effectiveness of passive monitoring 
and control very significantly. At the worse, it might adversely affect the quality of 
corporate governance, because it may tempt managers to ‘maximize the value of the firm’ 
in the sort-term rather than pursuing strategies that would maximize the long –term value 
of the firm.  
 
Active monitoring and control is made by the board of directors, a large shareholder, a 
large creditor, or the market for corporate control. Institutional investors often behave 
like traders and do not spend resources for active monitoring and control of the firm, 
because of the ‘free-ride’ problem
5.  
 
4.3. Board of directors   
 
Evidence points at board of directors dominated by the incumbent management. 
Therefore, most corporate governance codes prescribe for “balanced board” with 
adequate number of “independent directors”, and separation of the positions of the 
chairman and the chief executive officer. For example, in India, clause 49 of the listing 
agreement requires that not less than 50% of directors should be non-executive directors; 
there should be at least 50% independent directors if the Chairman is executive; and in 
case of non-executive Chairman at least one-third should be independent directors. The 
expectation is that a balanced board would be able to make an objective assessment of the 
executive management. However, evidence suggests that even a balanced board of 
directors react very late and mostly under outside pressure. With regards to the board 
size, the literature states that optimal size should be between 6 to 8 members. However, 
in many of the PSUs the number of directors are any where between 12 to 20. 
 
4.4. Large shareholders  
 
Evidence suggests that concentration of ownership improves the control of managers by 
overcoming the ‘free-ride’ problem. However, evidence also suggests that a financial 
institution having large investment intervenes only when the firm is in distress. On the 
negative side, a large shareholder may indulge in ‘self-dealing’ and create private 
benefits. This adversely affects the interest of small shareholders or debt holders.  
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4.5. Large creditors 
 
Debt is another instrument to discipline managers and reduce agency costs. The failure to 
repay the debt results in transfer of control from the manager to the creditor. Therefore, 
the manger works hard to avoid default. On the negative side, the debt holder, because of 
its relatively high bargaining power, may extract rent from the firm. Moreover, excessive 
debt in the capital structure may cause debt overhang, where the manager does not 
choose a good project because most returns will go to debt holders. 
 
4.6. Market for corporate control 
 
Proxy contests, friendly mergers, and hostile takeovers are considered complementary 
with internal control mechanisms. The threat of take over motivates the incumbent 
management to perform at the optimal level. However, there is scant evidence that 
operating performance of a firm increases with a takeover.  
 
Becht et al. (2002) provides a comprehensive survey of corporate governance literature. 
Interested readers may refer to the paper for an understanding of corporate governance 
models. 
 
5. Implications of Corporate Governance Failure 
 
The failure of the corporate governance system should be viewed as the failure of the 
‘corporate internal control system’. While reviewing the performance in USA Jensen 
(2000) observes: 
 
“The problem of internal control systems starts with the board of directors. The board, at 
the apex of the internal control system, has the final responsibility for the functioning of 
the firm. Most importantly, it sets the rules of the game for the CEO. The job of the board 
is to hire, fire, and compensate the CEO and to provide high level counsel. Few boards in 
the past decades have done this job well in the absence of external crises. This is 
particularly unfortunate given that the very purpose of internal control mechanism is to 
provide an early warning system to put the organization back on track before difficulties 
reach a crisis stage.” 
 
Failure of the corporate internal control system results in ‘waste of free cash flows’. This 
happens because: 
 
a)  Managers resort to ‘power-seeking’ activities rather than ‘value-seeking’ 
activities. They invest for revenue growth and unwarranted diversification. 
b)  Managers fail to visualize early the excess capacity in the industry resulting from 
decline in demand, technological changes, and globalization. 
c)  Managers expropriate shareholders’ wealth. They indulge in self-dealing. They 
benefit themselves with perquisites disproportionate to the firm performance and 
  10industry norms. They take decisions to improve the performance of the firm in the 
short term ignoring the detrimental effect of those decisions on the long-term 
health of the firm.  
d)  Managers fail to provide the right organization culture and supporting 
environment.  
e)  Managers shirk responsibilities. 
f)  Managers entrench control in spite of poor performance. 
 
6. Policy Implications for Public sector enterprises 
  
Boubkari et al. (2004) studied a sample of 209 privatized firms from 39 countries over 
the period 1980-2001. They concluded that the government relinquishes control over time 
to the benefit of local institutions, individuals, and foreign investors, and that private 
ownership tends to concentrate over time. Firm size, growth, and industry affiliation, 
privatization method, as well as the institutional development and investor protection, 
explain the cross-firm differences in ownership concentration.  
 
We assume that the experience in India will be little different because the government has 
decided not to privatize PSUs. With disinvestment, government holding will come down, 
but not below 51%. However, a few shareholders (individuals and/or body corporate) 
might acquire substantial voting rights in those enterprises, even if the government takes 
the capital market route for divesting its holding and PSUs access the capital market to 
raise fund. Therefore, concentration of voting rights in the hands of one or two large 
shareholders cannot be ruled out. 
 
The premise of our discussion in this section is that PSUs are not pure commercial 
ventures of the government. As in the past, in the future also the government will use 
PSUs to achieve social welfare especially in situations where other instruments might fail 
to deliver the desired results.  
 
6.1. Objective function 
 
We believe that the objective function of all PSUs cannot be ‘maximization of the firm 
value’. The government should formulate well defined strategy for each PSU and 
establish the objective function based on that strategy. The government should spell out 
the objective function of each enterprise very clearly. For example, the objective function 
of ONGC might be ‘to help the government in achieving energy security’. Clarity and 
transparency in communicating the objective function to all stake holders is essential to 
protect the interest of non-government investors and to ensure effective functioning of the 
enterprise. The board of directors should use the ‘objective function’ as the guide post in 
managing the resources of the firm. 
 
The government should review and if necessary, revise the objective function to meet 
structural changes in the socio-economic environment or changes in national priorities. 
However, frequent revisions should be avoided. Frequent revisions would confuse the 
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government should not set multiple objectives for a particular PSU. It is said that 
‘multiple objectives is no objective’, because in most situation objectives are conflicting 
in nature.  
 
In short, the vision and mission statements of a PSU should be framed by the 
government, and that should clearly reflect the ‘objective function’ established for the 
particular PSU. The board of directors should adapt the same. 
 
6.2. Managerial and commercial autonomy 
 
The government should act as an informed and responsible promoter and majority 
shareholder of PSUs. After disinvestment, the government does not remain the sole-
owner of the PSU. It becomes accountable to other equity holders. Therefore, it should 
act transparently. Transparency is the corner stone of a good corporate governance 
system.  
 
PSUs should be kept immune from political and bureaucratic interferences. It is now well 
established that political and bureaucratic interference affects the performance of an 
enterprise adversely. Therefore, the government should control and monitor PSUs 
without interfering in their day to day management. The government policy to provide 
managerial and commercial autonomy to PSUs ,operating in a competitive environment, 
is a welcome step. We suggest that the government should grant autonomy to all PSUs, 
even to those enterprises that are enjoying monopoly position. The government after 
formulating the strategy and issuing the clear mandate should adopt the hands-off 
approach as regards day to day management of the enterprise. 
 
Managerial and commercial autonomy to a PSU implies autonomy to the board of 
directors in taking operating decisions. It should not be viewed as autonomy to the CEO 
of the PSU. Ultimate accountability for managing a PSU efficiently and effectively to 
achieve results as mandated by the government rests with its board of directors. 
 
KPIs and the performance metric of an enterprise reflect its objective function. For a firm 
that has the objective function of ‘maximization of the firm value’, economic value added 
(EVA), market value added (MVA) or ‘market value to book value ratio’ might be the 
appropriate score (a single measure) for performance measurement.  None of these may 
be appropriate for a firm that has an objective function different from “maximization of 
firm value’. It is difficult to develop a single measure (the score) that captures the overall 
performance of such a firm. The board of a PSU should decide KPIs and formulate a 
score card. The score card provides a structure to managers to understand the ‘objective 
function’. It helps managers to understand value drivers
4 that are to be managed to 
achieve desired results. The government should approve key performance indicators 
(KPI) and the score card proposed by the board of directors. Vetting by the government 
                                                 
4 Value drivers are variables that determine the result of an enterprise in terms of its achieving the objective 
function. 
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vision and mission statements, and value drivers of the enterprise 
 
6.3. Business plan, budget and MOU 
 
Each PSU should prepare a five-year business plan, often termed as corporate plan. 
Business plan period should be coterminous with the five-year plan period. The business 
plan should be approved by the government. At the beginning of the plan period the 
government should indicate the budgetary support, if necessary, it would provide to an 
enterprise to enable it to achieve the target performance. The approved five-year business 
plan provides the framework within which the annual plan should be prepared. The 
annual plan should be approved by the board of directors.  
 
The present practice is that the government enters into a memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) with each PSU on yearly basis. The MOU is a negotiated agreement between the 
board of directors and the government. It sets the targets to be achieved against various 
value drivers. It assigns weight to different drivers highlighting the importance of each 
driver to achieve the desired results. The greatest advantage of MOU is that the board of 
directors and the government jointly decides annual targets and the type and amount of  
government support required to achieve those targets. On the negative side, the direct 
involvement of the government in formulating annual targets undermines the 
independence and authority of the board of directors and dilutes its accountability. 
Moreover, the process of finalizing MOU is a negotiation process and has the potential 
for political and bureaucratic interference in the operating decisions. The guidelines for 
MOU for the year 2004-05 reads “specific areas in which further autonomy and financial 
powers desired may also be incorporated with justification as to how these additional 
powers will stimulate the growth of the company”. This stipulation raises a serious doubt 
on the government’s intention to grant full operational autonomy to PSUs. Presumably, 
the stipulation is based on the government’s belief that autonomy to board of directors is 
negotiable.  
 
The government should dispense with the present practice of signing MOU with PSUs, 
because the dysfunctional effects outweigh advantages of the practice. Similarly, the 
government should dispense with the practice of the periodical review of the performance 
of PSUs. This review at its best is a waste of government resources by duplicating an 
activity that is the responsibility of the board of directors and at its worse it undermines 
the independence and authority of the board of directors. It has the potential to place the 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO), who directly interacts with the government through this 
process, above the board of directors. This severely restrains the authority of the board of 
directors to control and monitor the executive management and dilutes the accountability 
of the board of directors.  
 
6.4. Board of directors and independent directors 
 
In accordance with the present disinvestment policy, PSUs will access the capital market 
for funds. Therefore, they will be governed by SEBI regulations. The board of directors 
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of the board of directors will be limited to 15 members. The government being the 
majority shareholder will elect its nominees to the board. However in nominating 
members to the board, the government should follow the principles stipulated in the draft 
‘OECD guidelines on the corporate governance of state owned enterprises’. The salient 
features of the ‘Guidelines’ are: 
 
a)  The government should not impede on board’s work and authority. 
b)  The government should nominate member of its staff on the board. This will help 
to articulate the government strategy while maintaining the full autonomy and 
authority of the board. 
c)  The government’s participation in the board should be limited. This would 
facilitate exercise of independent judgment by the board. The excessive 
representation by the government might be perceived by other members as 
decrease of the board’s independence and authority. This might also disrupt the 
proper dynamics of the board. 
 
The government should appoint professionals having competence and understanding of 
business as board members. It may be a good idea to invite other large shareholders to 
nominate their representatives to the board. This will help them to understand the 
government strategy. This will also reduce the chances of ‘self dealing’ by large 
shareholders by reducing the possibility of private lobbying with the government outside 
the board. 
 
An independent director in a PSU board should not only be independent of the executive 
management, she should also be independent of the government and the political parties 
in the power. Therefore, the government should avoid appointing individuals with 
perceived political affiliation to the board of directors of a PSU as an independent 
director.  
 
The government, as the promoter of a PSU and as a majority shareholder, should closely 
monitor the performance of the enterprise and the performance of its board of directors. 
The government should enforce control and monitoring through government officials, 
who are members of the board of directors. They should clearly communicate the 
government strategy and government views on various issues in the board meeting 
without impeding the independence and authority of other directors. The onus is on the 
government to ensure that the government views are not perceived as government 
mandate by other members of the board. It is the responsibility of the government to 
ensure free and frank discussion of various issues in board meetings. It may be a good 
practice to avoid communicating government views to the board of directors through the 
CEO or the Chairman of the board.  
 
6.5. The role of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) 
 
The failure of corporate governance is the failure of the corporate internal control system. 
Therefore, the CAG should ensure that the corporate internal control system is adequate 
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work of statutory auditors. The responsibility for improving the quality of audit lies with 
the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI). Recently the ICAI has taken 
number of initiatives to improve the quality of audit. Moreover, with the review of the 
accounting policy and audit comments by the audit committee (of the board of directors), 
the audit quality is likely to improve. 
 
The proprietary audit should be left to the internal auditor. It is the responsibility of the 
audit committee of the board to decide the internal audit brief, to ensure independence to 
the internal auditor and to review the ‘action taken reports’. The CAG should not 
duplicate the efforts of the audit committee. 
 
The CAG should focus on the comprehensive review of PSUs. It should strengthen the 
practice of comprehensive review. It should undertake comprehensive review of a PSU at 
an interval of four years. This will provide an assurance that the corporate internal control 
system is adequate and operating effectively and will identify the areas of weakness. It 
will also identify ‘waste of free cash flows’, if any. The comprehensive review should be 
more a ‘management audit’ than an ‘operation audit’.    
7. Conclusion 
The corporate governance structure of PSUs cannot be exactly the same as that of private 
sector enterprises, because the objective function of a PSU may not necessarily be the 
‘maximization of firm value’. Moreover, the government cannot participate directly in 
the day to day management of the enterprise like a private promoter or the controlling 
group of shareholders, because political and bureaucratic interference affects the 
performance of an enterprise adversely. Therefore, the corporate governance structure of 
a PSU should ensure effective control and monitoring by the government without 
political and bureaucratic interference. 
 
The government should grant full autonomy and independence to the board of directors. 
It should retain the authority to: 
 
a)  Formulate the strategy and set the objective function: 
b)  Frame the ‘vision and mission statements’ in consultation with the board of 
directors; 
c)  Approve KPIs and score card formulated by the board; and 
d)  Approve the five-year business plan.  
 
It should relinquish all other direct controls on PSUs. It should dispense with the present 
system of signing MOU on yearly basis and the system of periodical review.  
 
The government should not have excessive representation, through government officials, 
in the board of directors. It should appoint professionals with competence and business 
knowledge as members of the board of directors. It should ensure free and frank 
discussions in board meetings. The CAG should strengthen the practice of comprehensive 
review to ensure that the corporate internal control system is adequate and operating 
  15effectively. It should give up the practice of reviewing the work of statutory auditors and 
the practice of propriety audit. 
 
We hope that the government will bring necessary changes in the present governance 
structure to enhance the productivity in the public sector.  
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END NOTES 
 
1 For details see Bagchi (1998, pp307-310). Some of the reasons are inability to choose the technology and 
product-mix against the pressures exerted by foreign firms because the purchase of the technology and 
equipment was tied up to foreign loans or aids; failure to monitor effectively the foreign contractors 
involved in setting up the new plants resulting in a difference between design capacity and effective 
capacity; and government interference and social priority stipulations by the government.   
2 In July 1997 the government granted enhanced autonomy and delegation of power to BHEL,BPCL, 
HPCL, IOC, IPCL, NTPC, ONGC, SAIL, and VSNL and called them ‘navratna’ (nine gems) . In 
November 1997 the government added MTNL and GAIL in the list of navratnas. In October 1997 the 
government granted enhanced autonomy to profit making PSEs and called them mini-ratnas. 
3 Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), the body that regulates listed companies to protect 
investors’ interest, has issued a ‘code of corporate governance’. The Code is implemented by incorporating 
the requirements in clause 49 of the listing agreement. Listed companies agree to honor the requirements of 
the listing agreement. Non-compliance results in de-listing of securities.  
4 An externality occurs when a decision (for example, to pollute the atmosphere) causes costs or benefits to 
individuals or groups other than the person making the decision. In other words, the decision-maker does 
not bear all of the costs or reap all of the gains from his or her action. 
5 Free riders are actors who take more than their fair share of the benefits or do not shoulder their fair share 
of the costs of their use of a resource, involvement in a project, etc.. The free rider problem is the question 
of how to prevent free riding from taking place, or at least limit its effects. 
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